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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This appeal presents the question of whether the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement should be extended to encompass a search when,
at the time of the search, no arrest was to occur. The State argues in its brief that
because the police officer had probable cause to arrest Mr. Lee for driving without
privileges prior to his search of certain containers found in Mr. Lee’s pocket, the search
of those containers was a lawful search incident to Mr. Lee’s arrest for possession of a
controlled substance, even though the objective facts indicate that no arrest was to
occur prior to the search, and no arrest would have occurred but for the search. This is
an unreasonable and unwarranted extension of the search incident to arrest exception
to the warrant requirement. A search cannot be justified by an arrest that, but for the
search, would never have occurred.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Lee relies on the statement of facts and course of proceedings he included in
his opening brief, which he incorporates herein by reference. (App. Br., pp.1-5.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Lee’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Lee’s Motion To Suppress
In his opening brief, Mr. Lee argued his frisk was unlawful because Officer
Laurenson did not have reason to believe Mr. Lee was armed and presently dangerous
at the time of the frisk. (App. Br., pp.7-11.) He also argued Officer Laurenson’s search
of the containers found in his pocket was unlawful because it was not authorized
pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.
(App. Br., pp.12-16.) In its brief, the State does not attempt to justify the frisk, but
argues only that Officer Laurenson’s search of the containers found in Mr. Lee’s pocket
was a lawful search incident to arrest, even though Mr. Lee was not arrested for driving
without privileges, but was arrested for possession of a controlled substance.
(Resp. Br., pp.7-14.) The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement
should not be extended to apply to a search where, as here, the objective facts indicate
that no arrest was to occur prior to the discovery of contraband during a search.
“A search incident to arrest need not necessarily occur after formal arrest to be
valid, but the argument that the search was incident to arrest becomes more strained
when the facts show that a defendant would not have been arrested but for the fact that
the search produced evidence of a crime . . . .” United States v. Davis, 111 F. Supp. 3d
323, 334-35 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). “Bootstrapping evidence found in a search ‘incident to
arrest’—based on probable cause for only a minor violation that would otherwise not
result in an arrest—so that the fruits of a search incident to arrest themselves provide
the justification for the arrest, is not permissible.” Id. at 334, n.7 (citing cases).
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In People v. Reid, the Court of Appeals of New York rejected the argument the
State makes here, and held “[a] search must be incident to an actual arrest, not just to
probable cause that might have led to an arrest, but did not.” 24 N.Y.3d 615, 619, 26
N.E.3d 237, 239 (2014). The court explained “[t]he ‘search incident to arrest’ doctrine,
by its nature, requires proof that, at the time of the search, an arrest has already
occurred or is about to occur. Where no arrest has yet taken place, the officer must
have intended to make one if the ‘search incident’ exception is to be applied.” Id.
Similarly, in People v. Mangum, the court held “[t]he intent to arrest for the offense
justifying the search must be present even if a defendant is ultimately arrested for a
different offense.” 125 A.D.3d 401, 402, 3 N.Y.S.3d 332, 334 (2015).
In the State’s view, as long as an officer has probable cause to arrest, he may
conduct a search incident to arrest, even if he’s neither making nor contemplating an
actual arrest, and then, if the search turns up contraband, effect an arrest that supplies
retroactive justification for the search. This argument is foreclosed by Knowles v. Iowa,
525 U.S. 113 (1998). In Knowles, the United States Supreme Court concluded a search
violated the Fourth Amendment when a police officer issued a traffic citation, searched
the defendant’s car, and then arrested the defendant based on what was found in the
car, because neither of the rationales underlying the search incident to arrest exception
were satisfied. Id. at 119.
Here, unlike in Knowles, Officer Laurenson did not issue a citation to Mr. Lee for
driving without privileges before he frisked him and searched the containers found in his
pocket. But this is a distinction without a difference. The Knowles Court rejected a
“search incident to citation” exception to the warrant requirement because it found the
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rationales underlying that exception were not present. Id. at 118-19. They are similarly
absent here. First, Officer Laurenson did not need to disarm Mr. Lee in order to take
him into custody.

Mr. Lee was handcuffed and detained in the back of Officer

Laurenson’s patrol car at the time Officer Laurenson searched the containers found in
Mr. Lee’s pocket. Second, there was no way the content of the containers could have
provided evidence for the offense of driving without privileges, which is the offense for
which Mr. Lee was being detained. As explained by the court in Reid, “[t]he problem, in
Knowles as here, was that the search caused the arrest and not the other way around.”
26 N.E.3d at 240. The same is true here. Mr. Lee was not searched because he was
arrested; he was arrested because he was searched.
Mr. Lee does not contend the court must conduct a subjective inquiry into an
officer’s intent to determine whether the search incident to arrest exception applies.
The inquiry that needs to be conducted in cases like this is objective—the question is
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, an officer was making an arrest or
would have made an arrest absent the results of the search. If so, then the search is a
search incident to arrest; if not, then the exception does not apply. One way to answer
this objective inquiry is to consider whether the officer has actually issued a citation or
conducted an arrest at the time of the search. Another way to answer this objective
inquiry is to consider the officer’s stated intentions. Where, as here, an officer testifies
that he had no intention to arrest at the time of the search, such testimony is powerful
objective evidence that the arrest would not have occurred but for the search.
In its brief, the State relies extensively on State v. Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463
(1999).

(Resp. Br., pp.11-13.)

The facts of Schwarz are somewhat similar to the
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present case, but the question presented here was neither raised nor decided in
Schwarz. In Schwarz, our Supreme Court upheld a patdown search of the defendant as
a valid search incident to his arrest where the officer had probable cause to arrest the
defendant on an outstanding arrest warrant based on the defendant’s admission to
being subject to such a warrant, despite the fact that the dispatcher gave the officer
incorrect information regarding the warrant.

Id. at 468.

The officer discovered

methamphetamine during the frisk, and then arrested the defendant for possession of a
controlled substance. Id. at 691. The defendant was later arrested on the outstanding
warrant. Id. In upholding the magistrate court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to
suppress, the Schwarz court did not cite Knowles and did not discuss whether the
objective facts indicated the officer intended to arrest the defendant prior to the frisk.
Schwarz should thus not be read to support the State’s argument in this case.
Because the objective facts here indicate that Mr. Lee was not going to be
arrested prior to the discovery of contraband during a search of the containers found in
his pocket, the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement does not
apply.

The search of those containers violated Mr. Lee’s rights under the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution and the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in the Appellate Brief,
Mr. Lee respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the district
court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court
for further proceedings.
DATED this 19th day of September, 2016.
__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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